Edward Steinfeld, a professor of political economy at MIT (I wish my school had offered political economy!), wrote a fascinating article entitled China's Other Revolution. In a nutshell he argues by comparison that the experiences of authoritarian breakdown in Taiwan and South Korea make it "not just possible but likely" that the recent crackdowns on free speech in China are a sign of the "last vestiges of authoritarian rule."
3 words: I totally disagree.
Don't get me wrong, Steinfeld's analysis of the rapidly evolving nature of the Chinese government and social norms/expectations are entirely correct, especially his breakdown of the inclusion of foreign educated experts into high levels of the Communist Party. His conclusions that the government of today is not the same as the government of the 1950's or even the 1980's are obvious to even the most casual viewer. He is also correct that we should not base public policy on the assumption that the CCP is a static entity. It is not. It has never been, and we should do our best to anticipate current trends and potential future trends.
Steinfeld's analysis of the history, the modernization, and the flexibility of the CCP are excellent and an invigorating read...but his conclusion that authoritarianism has already begun to end, and that we are "likely" seeing the last throes of a dying authoritarian system, is a baseless stretch. In one breath, he admits that it is impossible to "fully appreciate the range of possible outcomes", and in the next breath predicts a drastic change in a particular direction that is likely to happen soon.
With a nod to the fact that is impossible to understand the true range of possible outcomes, I believe fundamental democratic change is not on the brink of happening in China. With all due respect to the Professor, he ignores the principal differences between the experiences of Taiwan and S. Korea and the experience of China. There are many key differences, but I will touch on a primary few.
1. At the time of their democratization, Taiwan and S. Korea were both fully dependent upon American protection to stay independent from the Chinese. The implications here are numerous, including: America was in a particularly strong position to encourage a particular type of change (which it did!). China is obviously in a much stronger position to resist American arm-twisting than either of these states ever were. The reason the dictatorships in TW and SK did not fight the democratization process was because it would have meant the end of their crucial support from Washington, not because the elites had changed their opinions about the desirability of absolute power. People in power want to stay that way, and the elites in SK and TW could only stay in power if they bowed to the pressure from Washington and permitted some level of democratization. It goes without saying that the Chinese will not be subjected to that decision (since the U.S-China relationship is one of mutual and not asymmetric dependence). The CCP (like all who are in power) wants to stay in power and has no compelling reason to surrender it.
2. The concept of democracy was viewed much differently by the masses in SK and TW during the period of democratization than democracy is viewed by the masses in China today. Sure, there are Chinese citizens who like the idea of democracy and would like to see the CCP take steps to democratize...but there are many, many more (especially among the educated elite whom Steinfeld relies upon for his "likely" changes) who have seen the limitations of democracies in the U.S. and Europe and believe that democracy is a fundamentally flawed system. I have personally spoken to such people, many of whom believe that democracies are essentially run by the easily deceived masses (who are short-sighted and reactionary). Many others believe that the rhetoric of democracy and human rights from the U.S. is merely cover for a secret agenda of regime change in China. They point to rights being violated in the U.S. and wars being fought without popular support to bolster these positions. The CCP propaganda machine works tirelessly at undermining democracy and that effort has been successful to a large degree. I have no evidence for this, but I would guess that the people in SK and TW had not been subjected a lifetime of propaganda undermining the concept of democracy. This argues strongly that there is and will be no groundswell of support for democracy in China in the short-term.
3. Steinfeld makes the assumption that almost all Western intellectuals make, i.e. there is no future for a modern thriving economy except a liberal, democratic political system. I totally disagree with this and point him to my article on Singapore in which I argue that a modern economy can be run hand in hand with an authoritarian political system. While I dismiss the possibility that China can be run in the same neat, clean way that Singapore can (based primarily on the scope of China and the differences in property law), Singapore's example is a clear and vibrant demonstration that liberal democracy is not the only path forward for a modern economy.
In the end, I liked the Steinfeld article, but I believe it to be wrong.
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